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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the district court correctly ruled that plaintiff has no right to contest
the child's adoption under governing statutes or due process.
Standard of Review: Correctness. Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah App.
1996).
Preservation of Issue: Raised by summary judgment motion. (R. 26-35.)
2. Whether the district court correctly ruled that plaintiff has no standing to
challenge the facial constitutionality of U.C.A. § 78-30-4.15(2).
Standard of Review: Correctness. York v. Unqualified Washington County Elected
Officials, 714 P.2d 679, 680 (Utah 1986).
Preservation of Issue: Raised on summary judgment. (R. 81-82.)
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
This case is governed by U.C.A. §§ 78-30-4.12 and -4.14, set forth verbatim in the
Addendum. (Add. 20.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a paternity action in which the plaintiff-appellant seeks custody of a
nonmarital, infant child that the mother placed for adoption over one-and-a-half years
ago. (R. 1.) The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on the grounds
that plaintiff failed to establish his parental rights prior to the mother's relinquishment.
The court held that by failing to comply with the statutory procedures to establish his

rights, plaintiff forfeited any right to custody or adoption consent,, Moreover, the court
found that the mother's silence on the subject of adoption did not violate plaintiffs due
process rights because the mother has a right of privacy, and plaintiff had a reasonable
opportunity to protect his own rights. (R. 112, Add. 1.) Plaintiff filed this appeal. (R.
116.) This Court denied cross-motions for summary disposition and defendant's motion
to expedite briefing. (Add. 4-5.)1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Mahaoud Al-Bahadli, is a 31 -year-old single man. Defendant Jill
LeCheminant is a 19-year-old single woman. They began dating and engaging in sexual
relations in October 1998. In February 1999, Jill learned that she was pregnant and
informed plaintiff of his paternity. (Affidavit of Jill LeCheminant,ffl[2-4, R. 39, Add. 6;
Affidavit of Mahaoud Al-Bahadli, «| 1, R. 50, Add. 18.)
Early in the pregnancy, Jill and plaintiff discussed how to deal with the pregnancy
and the child. Throughout the pregnancy, Jill attended counseling sessions and parenting
classes with LDS Family Services ("Agency") to consider her options, including possible
adoption. Plaintiff knew Jill was attending these classes, but denies knowing they
included discussion of adoption. Plaintiff denies discussing adoption, but it is undisputed
that Jill never told plaintiff she would not place the child for adoption. (LeCheminant
Afft, ffif 5-7; Al-Bahadli Afft, ffi[ 3-4.)

1

Contrary to plaintiffs unsupported assertions (Br. of App. 4-5), the mother has made no admission
that she misled plaintiff concerning the adoption

2

The baby was born August 10, 1999. Jill informed plaintiff of the birth, and
plaintiff visited the mother and child in the hospital. Because of medical complications,
the child remained in the hospital for three months, until November 9, 1999. Jill and
plaintiff discussed marriage plans, but never carried them out. In any event, it is
undisputed that Jill never told plaintiff she and the baby would live with him. Plaintiff
paid none of the expenses of Jill's pregnancy or of the child's birth. (LeCheminant Aff t,
ffi[8, 12; R. 4.)
On October 18, 1999, two months after the birth, Carolyn Chudley, Jill's Agency
social worker, telephoned plaintiff to verify that he was aware of the child's possible
adoption. Carolyn explained that Jill had decided not to marry plaintiff and that Jill was
still considering placing the child for adoption. Plaintiff responded that he did not believe
Jill would place the child for adoption because "she loves the baby too much," and she
knew plaintiff opposed adoption. (Affidavit of Carolyn Chudley,fflf6-7, R. 42, Add. 9;
Al-Bahadli Aff t, ] 6.)2

2

Plaintiff concedes that Carolyn discussed Jill's "placing the child," but now denies that she used the
word "adoption." (Al-Bahadli Aff t, ^ 6.) However, as presented at the summary judgment hearing (Tr.
52-53), plaintiff previously testified in his deposition that Carolyn may have used the word "adoption,"
but he could not remember:
Q. Did you ever receive a call from the adoption agency telling you that Jill was
considering adoption?
A. No. Carolyn, she called me. She called my house.

Q. Didn't she mention adoption when she called you?
[cont]

3

On November 9, 1999, the hospital discharged the baby to Jill's custody, and she
informed plaintiff and the Agency of her decision to place the child for adoption. Jill
took the baby to the Agency, which verified that plaintiff had not filed notice of a
paternity action with the Utah Department of Health. Jill then signed the relinquishment
and consent to adoption. The Agency immediately placed the child with adoptive
parents, with whom the child has continuously resided. (LeCheminant Aff t,ffl[9-11;
ChudleyAfft,^8-10.)
Plaintiff commenced this action on December 1, 1999, seeking custody of the
child and support payments from Jill. (R. 1-3.) The complaint makes no reference to any
misrepresentation. As of the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff had not filed notice
of his paternity action with the Utah Department of Health. (Chudley Aff t, U 11.)
Plaintiff claims to have filed the notice on January 14, 2000, but no certificate of filing
appears in the record. (Al-Bahadli Aff t, ^j 8.)
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff
failed to establish his paternal rights according to statutory requirements prior to Jill's

A. No. No. No. I don't understand adoption....
Q. So Carolyn never used the word "adoption"?
A. I don't know. I can't remember . . . .

A . . . . I'm not sure if Carolyn said that word "adoption " or not. I can't tell you
if she said, Think about adoption or not. If she did ask me about adoption, I mean I don't
know. [Al-Bahadli Dep. 51-54, emp. added.]
Plaintiffs deposition prevails over his subsequent affidavit to the contrary. See, e.g., Webster v. Sill, 675
P.2d 1170,1172-73 (Utah 1983).

4

relinquishment. (R. 26-49.) In response to the motion, plaintiff identified no material
issue of fact, arguing only that he was "misled" by Jill's failure to inform him of the
possible adoption. He also challenged the constitutionality of an unrelated fraud
provision in the adoption statute. (R. 54-58.) The district court granted summary
judgment for defendants on the grounds asserted, concluding that plaintiff failed to
comply with statutory requirements, that compliance was possible, and that Jill was not
obligated to inform plaintiff of her planned adoption. Therefore, plaintiff has no right to
custody or to contest the adoption. The court also held that the fraud provision of the
statute was not at issue and was not properly raised, (R. 112-14, Add. 3.) Plaintiff
appeals from that order. (R. 116.) This Court denied cross-motions for summary
disposition, deferring the issues until completion of briefing and argument. (Add. 4.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah law requires an unwed father to comply with certain statutory procedures in
order to establish his rights and oppose the adoption. Plaintiff concedes that he failed to
comply with those required procedures; therefore, he has no statutory right to contest the
child's adoption.
The due process exception applies only when the father demonstrates, first, that it
was "impossible" to comply with the statutes because of ignorance of when and where the
child was born; and, second, that he had no "reasonable opportunity" to protect his
interests because of misrepresentations by the mother. The reasonable opportunity
analysis does not apply unless impossibility is shown first.
5

It was not "impossible" for plaintiff to comply with Utah law because he and the
mother are Utah residents, were at all times present in Utah, and plaintiff knew that the
child would be, or had been, born in Utah. Absent impossibility, no inquiry into
reasonable opportunity is required. However, even if applied, plaintiff had a "reasonable
opportunity" to protect his rights because he was not misled by the mother. The mother
had no legal obligation to inform plaintiff of her adoption plans. Moreover, her
statements that she was attending parenting classes and would marry plaintiff were true
and did not preclude a possible adoption. The mother never told plaintiff that she would
not place the child for adoption, or that she and the child would live with him. In any
event, plaintiff is presumed to know of the possibility of adoption, and the Agency gave
plaintiff actual notice that the mother was considering adoption. Therefore, plaintiff
should have been aware of the need to protect his rights.
Plaintiff has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory fraud
provision because that provision was not applied in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFF
HAS NO RIGHT TO CONTEST THE ADOPTION BECAUSE HE
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
AND DOES NOT MEET THE DUE PROCESS EXCEPTION TO
THOSE REQUIREMENTS.

Statutory Compliance.
The rights and responsibilities of the various parties involved in the adoption of an

out-of-wedlock child are set forth in U.C.A. § 78-30-4.12(2). "[T]he state has a
6

compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a
prompt manner, in preventing the disruption of adoptive placements, and in holding
parents accountable for meeting the needs of children." Subsection (a). The "unmarried
mother, faced with the responsibility of making crucial decisions about the future of a
newborn child, is entitled to privacy, and has the right to make timely and appropriate
decisions regarding her future and the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance
regarding the permanence of an adoptive placement." Subsection (b). The child has "a
right to permanence and stability in adoptive placements." Subsection (c). The "adoptive
parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interest in retaining custody
of an adopted child." Subsection (d). However, the unmarried father has only "an
inchoate interest that acquires constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a
timely and full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy
and upon the child's birth." Subsection (e). Accordingly, the "state has a compelling
interest in requiring unmarried biological fathers to demonstrate that commitment... by
establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the requirements of this chapter." Id.
Section 78-30-4.12(3)(a) states that statutory standards are applied to determine
whether the unwed father's action "is sufficiently prompt and substantial to require
constitutional protection." If the father fails timely to grasp his opportunity for legal
rights through strict compliance with statutory procedures, "his biological parental
interest may be lost entirely." Subsection (b). "A certain degree of finality is necessary
in order to facilitate the state's compelling interest" in providing prompt and permanent
7

placements for adoptive children. Therefore, "the interests of the state, the mother, the
child, and the adoptive parents . . . outweigh the interest of an unmarried biological father
who does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish" his parental rights in accordance
with statutory requirements. Subsection (c). The unmarried father "has the primary
responsibility to protect his rights," and he "is presumed to know that the child may be
adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies with" statutory requirements to
establish his paternal rights. Subsections (d) and (e).
Section 78-30-4.14(2) sets forth the statutory requirements for an unwed father to
assert his parental rights. An unwed father of a newborn child may contest the child's
adoption "only if the father has strictly complied with the requirements of" subsection
(b). Subsection (b) requires the father to "have manifested a full commitment to his
parental responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in this subsection prior to
the time the mother executes her consent for adoption" (Emp. added.) The father must:
(i) initiate a paternity action, setting forth his ability, desire, and plan to care for and
financially support the child; (ii) file notice of that paternity action with the Department
of Health; and (iii) have paid "a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in
connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth."
Most importantly, section 78-30-4.14(5) states that an unwed father who fails
timely to comply with these statutory requirements is deemed to have waived his paternal
rights, including any right to contest the adoption:

8

An unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly
comply with each of the conditions provided in this section, is deemed to
have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child, including the
right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of
the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required.
Accordingly, an unwed father who fails to file notice of commencement of a paternity
action "prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption" forfeits his
parental rights and is barred from contesting the adoption.
Plaintiff conceded in the district court, and does not dispute on appeal, that he
failed to comply with the foregoing statutory requirements. (Tr. 24, 32.) His paternity
action was not filed until three weeks after Jill's relinquishment. His complaint fails to
demonstrate his ability and plan to care for and financially support the child; rather, he
seeks financial support from Jill. The record contains no proof that he filed notice of his
paternity action with the Department of Health. Moreover, plaintiff paid none of the
expenses of Jill's pregnancy or of the child's birth. Therefore, plaintiff "is deemed to
have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child,... and his consent to the
adoption of the child is not required." 78-30-4.14(5). See, e.g., In re Adoption ofB.B.D.,
1999 UT 70,ffil17, 26, 984 P.2d 967 (unwed father "failed to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements of the law; and he has therefore forfeited any parental rights to the
child"); Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 795 P.2d 637, 640 (Utah 1990) (rights of
noncomplying unwed father are "automatically terminated" with the mother's
relinquishment); Sanchez v. L.D.S Social Services, 680 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1984) (it is
"not too harsh" to require an unwed father either to comply with the statutes or "to yield"
9

to the adoption); Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 898 (Utah App. 1996) (ignorance of the
law is no excuse from strict statutory compliance).
C.

Due Process Exception.
Plaintiff argues that the foregoing statutes are unconstitutional as applied to him

because he had no reasonable opportunity to comply. (Br. of App. 7.) Plaintiff relies
exclusively on Ellis v. Social Sei-vices Dept., 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), and In re
Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 111 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986), attempting to conform the facts
here to the facts of those cases. However, those cases are factually very different from
the present case, and plaintiff has misapplied the "reasonable opportunity" standard.
1.

Impossibility and Reasonable Opportunity.

In Ellis, supra, the unwed parents resided in California and were engaged to be
married. Several days before the birth, the mother came to Utah without notifying the
father, gave birth, represented that the father was unknown, and relinquished the child for
adoption. 615 P.2d at 1252-53. Some days later, after discovering what had happened,
the father filed the required notice of paternity and law suit, claiming violation of due
process for lack of notice. The court noted that "[i]n the usual case, the putative father
would either know or reasonably should know approximately when and where his child
was born." Id. at 1256 (emp. added). However, if the father could show that it was
"impossible" to comply with the statute, "through no fault of his own," based on lack of
notice of "when and where" his child was born, he should "be permitted to show that he
was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute." Id. (emp. added).
10

The case was remanded to give the father an opportunity "to show as a factual matter that
he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be bom in Utah." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court clarified this "reasonable opportunity" standard in Wells
v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984). As the Wells court emphasized,
"Due process does not require that the father of an illegitimate child be identified and
personally notified before his parental right can be terminated." Id. at 207. "[S]uch a
requirement would frustrate the compelling state interest in the speedy determination" of
parental responsibility for the child, as well as "threaten the privacy interests of unwed
mothers." Id. The "reasonable opportunity" standard applies only "when it is first shown
that it was 'impossible' for the father to file 'through no fault of his own.'" Id. at 208.
"Otherwise, the need to prove in each adoption case that the unwed father . . . had a
'reasonable opportunity' to file the required notice of paternity would frustrate the
statute's purpose to facilitate secure adoptions by early clarification of status." Id.
Statutory compliance is not "impossible" as long as the father knows the child is to be
born in Utah. Id. at 207. See also In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 1999 UT 70, \ 17, 984 P.2d
967 (father was required to comply with the Utah statute because he knew the baby was
in Utah); Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 896 (Utah App. 1996) (father was subject to
Utah statutory requirements because he knew the child was in Utah).
The Ellis "reasonable opportunity" standard does not apply in the present case
because plaintiff has failed to make the threshold showing that it was "impossible" for
him to comply with the statute "through no fault of his own." Plaintiff and Jill are Utah
11

residents, and plaintiff knew throughout the pregnancy that the baby would be born in
Utah. In fact, he knew for three months following the birth that the baby had been bom
in Utah. Accordingly, unlike the California father in Ellis, who had no idea the mother
was in Utah, plaintiff always knew that Jill was here and, consequently, that Utah law
would apply. Because plaintiff could reasonably expect the child to be bom in Utah, it
was not "impossible" for him to comply with Utah law. Absent a prior showing of
impossibility, the "reasonable opportunity" standard does not even come into play. Ellis,
supra, at 1256; Wells, supra, at 208; see also Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 795 P.2d
637, 642 (Utah 1990) ("the reasonable opportunity standard adopted in Ellis [i]s
applicable [only] when 'it was 'impossible' for the father to file 'through no fault of his
own'").
The case of Baby Boy Doe, cited by plaintiff, is also easily distinguishable. There,
the unwed parents were, again, California residents, and the mother came to Utah during
the pregnancy. A few weeks prior to the birth, the mother told the father that she would
move to Arizona prior to the birth and that she and the baby would live there with him.
In reliance on the mother's statement, the father went to Arizona to prepare living
arrangements. Meanwhile, the baby was born early in Utah, without the father's
knowledge, and two days later the mother relinquished the child for adoption in Utah.
The father learned of the birth and relinquishment the following day, and he filed the
required claim of paternity one day later. 717 P.2d at 687-88, 690. In a 3-2 decision, the
court held that the statute, as applied, violated due process. Under the first prong of
12

analysis, compliance with Utah law was deemed "impossible" because the father
reasonably expected the child to be bom in Arizona; he did not know of the birth in Utah;
and he was absent from Utah before and during the birth. Under the second prong, the
father had no "reasonable opportunity" to comply with Utah adoption statutes because of
the mother's representations to the father that she and the child would live with him in
Arizona. Id. at 690-91. While the mother was not required to give the father actual
notice of the planned adoption, neither could she misrepresent that there would be no
adoption. Id. at 690.
In sharp contrast to those facts, as noted above, plaintiff and Jill are Utah residents;
they never left Utah; and plaintiff knew of the birth in Utah. Accordingly, under the first
prong of analysis, plaintiff never had any reason to expect that another state's law would
apply, and compliance with Utah law was not "impossible." That ends the analysis, but
even if the second prong were applicable, plaintiff has not shown that he was denied a
"reasonable opportunity" to comply with the adoption statutes. Unlike the father in Baby
Boy Doe, plaintiff was not misled to believe there would be no adoption. Contrary to
plaintiffs unsupported assertions, the record contains no evidence of any such statement.
See Adoption ofB.B.D., supra, at ^j 31-32 (unwed father "misstates the record" and
makes assertions not found in the record).
Jill's statement that she was attending parenting classes at the Agency was true.
Apparently, plaintiff never asked, and Jill never stated, whether she was also receiving
private adoption counseling. Jill and plaintiff never discussed adoption at all, either way,
13

to say that it would or would not happen. Jill, herself, was undecided on adoption until
the morning she took the child from the hospital. Under her right of privacy, Jill had no
obligation to inform plaintiff that she was considering adoption. Adoption ofB.B.D.
supra, at TI15; Wells, supra, at 207; Baby Boy Doe, supra, at 691 ("actual notice is not
required prior to termination of parental rights"). Most importantly, the record is
undisputed that Jill never told plaintiff she would not place the child for adoption.
(LeCheminant Aff t, ^ 7.)
Moreover, Jill's statement that she intended to marry plaintiff was also true, as it
included no express reference to the child and, therefore, did not preclude also placing the
child for adoption. Marriage and adoption are separate, and not necessarily related,
decisions. Jill wanted to continue her relationship with plaintiff without the
responsibilities of motherhood. Jill never told plaintiff that she and the child would live
with him after taking the child from the hospital. Plaintiff may have "assumed" that
mother and child would live with him, as did the father in Sanchez, supra, 680 P.2d at
755; however, as held in Sanchez, that assumption does not protect the father's rights. By
merely assuming there will be no adoption, an unwed father also assumes the risk that
there could be.
2.

Constructive and Actual Notice.

Not only was plaintiff not misled concerning adoption, he was on legal and actual
notice of possible adoption. As the Supreme Court stated in Adoption ofB.B.D., supra,
after discussing the mother's right of privacy concerning adoption:
14

An unmarried father, on the other hand, "by virtue of the fact that he has
engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice
that a pregnancy and an adoption proceeding regarding that child may
occur." Because he is deemed to be on notice, it becomes his responsibility
to protect his own rights of notice and consent according to the
requirements of section 78-30-4.13 to -4.15. [1999 UT 70, If 15, emp.
added, citation omitted.]
In addition, even though not legally required, see Beltran, supra, at 898, the Agency
provided actual notice of possible adoption to plaintiff when Carolyn Chudley phoned
him, over two months after the birth and more than three weeks prior to the
relinquishment, stating that Jill was considering placing the child for adoption. Plaintiff
quibbles over the words used, but the meaning was clear, and if the meaning was not
clear, he should have inquired of Carolyn or discussed the matter with Jill. Because
plaintiff had notice, both constructive and actual, of possible adoption, he "cannot argue
that he was deceived or lulled into believing he did not need to take proper steps to
protect his rights." Beltran, supra, at 897. See also Adoption ofB.B.D., supra, \ 17
(father who knows of possibility of adoption cannot claim violation of due process);
Swayne, supra, at 643 (father who knows of possible adoption "should have been aware
of the need to protect his parental rights").3
In summary, this case illustrates the conflicting rights and interests of unwed
parents. The mother has the right to place the child for adoption consistent with her
3

As indicated previously, plaintiffs complaint contains no allegation of, or reference to, fraud or
misrepresentation of any kind. Therefore, such claims cannot be raised in a belated effort to avoid
summary judgment. See, e.g., Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1983) (plaintiff who failed
to plead fraud in the complaint cannot assert it for the first time in opposing summary judgment); DeBry
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995) (upholding summary judgment on fraud claim for failure to
plead it with particularity, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b)).
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judgment of what is best for herself and the child. She has no obligation to involve the
father in her decision. The mother, Agency, and adoptive parents must be able to rely on
a definite procedure and measure of the father's rights in order to prevent the trauma of
later disruption of the adoption. See Wells, supra, at 206-07 ("such determinations must
also be final and irrevocable"); Beltran, supra, at 898 ("Utah law requires strict
compliance to provide certainty and finality to adoptions"). Meanwhile, the father has the
duty to protect his own rights. He can perfect his paternal rights and effectively veto the
mother's adoption decision by simply complying with the statutory requirements. By
failing to follow those requirements, the father assumes the risk of losing his parental
rights. Moreover, informal expressions of interest in the child, gifts for the child, visits to
the hospital, or statements of opposition to adoption are no substitute for strict compliance
with the statutes. E.g., Adoption ofB.B.D., supra, at ^] 20; Swayne, supra, at 641;
Sanchez, supra, at 755-56; Beltran, supra, at 896. Neither does plaintiff come within the
due process exception established by Ellis and Baby Boy Doe because he knew of the
birth here in Utah, and he was not misled concerning the possibility of adoption, having
received actual notice of that possibility. Therefore, the district court correctly held that
plaintiff has no rights in relation to the child.4
4

In passing, plaintiff asserts that material issues of fact preclude summary judgment. (Br. of App. 9.)
However, the record discloses no such material issues. There is no dispute that Jill and plaintiff never
discussed adoption, but did discuss marriage, as explained above. Plaintiff "misstates the record," as did
the father in B.B.D., supra, at % 32, by claiming that he and Jill also discussed "rais[ing] their son." No
such statement appears in the record. Other claimed factual issues are not material to the legal analysis.
In any event, plaintiff failed to identify any material issues of fact in opposing the motion for summary
judgment in the district court. Therefore, "[a]ll material facts set forth in the movant's statement... shall
be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment." Rule 4-501(2)(B), Code of Jud. Admin.
The district court so held. (Order, \ 1, Add. 2.)
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POINT II:

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFF
LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE FACIAL
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 78-30-4.15(2).

Plaintiff argues, without analysis or discussion of case law, that section 78-304.15(2) is unconstitutional on its face because it "contradicts" the "reasonable
opportunity" standard discussed above. (Br. of App. 10.) However, as the district court
concluded, plaintiff lacks standing to raise the issue. (Order, ^ 9, Add. 3.)5
Section 78-30-4.15(2) provides that "[a] fraudulent representation is not a defense
to strict compliance with the requirements of this chapter." This provision merely
emphasizes that unwed parents are expected to protect their own rights, rather than
relying on assumptions or actions and statements of the other parent. See Subsection
-4.15(1). However, this provision was never invoked or applied in this case because there
was no fraud. As the district court held, plaintiff neither alleged nor proved any act of
fraud by Jill. (Order, ^j 2, Add. 2.) Therefore, the issue whether fraud is a defense to
strict compliance with the statute never came up. Because this statute was not invoked to
defeat plaintiffs claims, he was not "injured" by it, and accordingly has no standing to
challenge its validity. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983) ("One
who is not adversely affected has no standing."); York v. Unqualified Washington County
Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679, 680 (Utah 1986) (action dismissed for lack of standing).

5

In addition, because the argument is presented without legal analysis or authority, this Court should
decline to address it. See, e.g., Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996); State v.
Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992).
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This Court does not address constitutional issues unnecessarily. See In re Adoption ofW9
904 P.2d 1113, 1119 n.7 (Utah App. 1995).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the order of summary judgment
for defendants.
Respectfully submitted this Q>

day of June, 2001.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

BY:

- ^ £ ^ C ^ ^ &:

^td2c^^

David M. McConkie
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
LDS Family Services
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee LDS Family Services to be mailed through United States mail, postage
prepaid, this j £ _ a a y of June, 2001, to the following:
G. Brent Smith
Steven C. Russell
AFFORDABLE LEGAL ADVOCATES
180 South 300 West, Suite 170
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
D. Bruce Oliver
180 south 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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David M. McConkie (#2154)
Merrill F.Nelson(#3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant
LDS Family Services
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MAHAOUD AL-BAHADLI,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 994907742
vs.

LDS FAMILY SERVICES and JILL
LECHEMINANT,

Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment came on for hearing on March 31, 2000.
1
Plaintiff was represented by Steven C. Russell; defendant LDS Family Services was represented
by Merrill F. Nelson; and defendant Jill LeCheminant was represented by D. Bruce Oliver. The
Court, having fully considered the written memoranda and oral arguments of the parties, hereby
enters the following order:
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1. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The material facts in defendants'
statement of undisputed material facts are deemed admitted because plaintiff failed to
specifically controvert any of those facts in his opposing memorandum.
2. Plaintiff did not properly allege fraud by defendant Jill LeCheminant. Alternatively,
plaintiff presented no evidence of fraud.
3. Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b).
4. Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b) is constitutional as applied to plaintiff. Plaintiff had
adequate opportunity to comply with the statute, and statutory compliance was not impossible.
5. Plaintiff is presumed to know the law, including his rights and obligations under the
law. Plaintiffs asserted ignorance of the law does not excuse him from compliance with the law.
6. Utah law provides a fair and reasonable balance of the competing rights and interests
of the various participants in the adoption of a nonmarital child. The state has a compelling
interest in the prompt and permanent placement of such a child with adoptive parents who will
assume parental responsibility for the child and provide the needs of the child. The unwed
mother, Jill LeCheminant, has a constitutional right of privacy to make timely and appropriate
decisions regarding herself and the future of the child. The child has a right to stability and
permanence in the adoptive placement. Plaintiff, an unwed father, has an inchoate, opportunity
interest that may be lost by his failure to comply strictly with statutory requirements. Those
requirements are clear and definitive, and plaintiff has the duty to protect his own rights and
interests. The mother, the adoption agency, and the adoptive parents are entitled to rely on those
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clear statutory procedures in determining the rights of the unwed father and deciding whether to
proceed with an adoption of the child.
7. By failing to comply with the requirements of section 78-30-4.14(2)(b), plaintiff is
deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child, and his consent to
adoption of the child is not required.
8. Plaintiff has no rights, and is entitled to no relief, in relation to the child.
9. The facial constitutionality of section 78-30-4.15(2) is not properly raised, is not in
issue, and plaintiff has no standing to raise the issue.
10. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and their motion for summary
judgment is granted.
DATED this / £ day of A * 2 | 2000.
BYTHE^0110^

William B. Bohling
District Court Judge

3
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FILED ,
Utah Court of Appeals

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEC 2 2 2000
PauteteStegg
Cleric of the Court

00O00

Mahaoud Al-Bahaldi,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

ORDER DENYING
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Case No. 20000605-CA

LDS Family Services and Jill
LeCheminant,
Defendant and Appellee.

This matter is before the court on Appellee LDS Family
Services1 motion for summary affirmance, and on Appellant's
motion for summary reversal, both pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions are each denied, and a
ruling on the issues raised therein is deferred pursuant to Rule
10(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, pending plenary
presentation and consideration of the appeal.
Dated thisc.:?/^,/ day of December, 2000.,
FOR THE COURT:

....-O
/ ?cz^^jL 7.

J^L

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge
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Utah Court of Appeals

JAM 2 vq 2001
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

P ^ ^ t t e Stagg
Clerk of the Court

ooOoo—

Mahaoud Al-Bahadli,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 20000605-CA
v.
LDS Family Services; Jill
Lechiminant,
Defendant and Appellee.
This matter is before the court upon appellee's motion,
filed January 9, 2001, to strike transcript request and commence
briefing. On January 23, 20 01, appellant filed a memorandum in
opposition to appellee's motion.
Appellant originally filed a request for transcript in the
trial court on June 9, 2 000. Subsequently, both parties filed
motions for summary disposition in this court. Pursuant to Rule
10(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, once a motion for
summary disposition is filed, the time for taking other steps in
the appeal is suspended pending disposition of the motion.
Following issuance of the court's order denying the motions for
summary disposition, appellant promptly renewed his transcript
request.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellee's motion
to strike transcript request and to commence briefing is denied.
Upon completion and filing of the requested transcript, and this
court's receipt of the record index, the briefing schedule will
be set and the parties notified of the due date for appellant's
brief.
Dated this ^ 9 day of January, 2001.
FOR THE COURT:
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David M. McConlcie (#2154)
Merrill F.Nelson (#3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendants
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MAHAOUD AL-BAHADLI,
AFFIDAVIT OF JILL
LECHEMINANT

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 994907742

vs.

LDS FAMILY SERVICES and JILL
LECHEMINANT,

Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Jill LeCheminant, hereby depose and affirm as follows:
1. I am the named individual defendant in this action and have personal laiowledge of the
matters here set forth.
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2. I am 19 years old and have never been married. I am the birth mother of the child at
issue in this case.
3. Plaintiff, Mahaoud Al-Bahadli, is the child's biological father. Mahaoud is 27 years
old, is from Iraq, and has never been married. He learned English in Iraq and Saudi Arabia
before coming to Utah; he has been in Utah four years. Mahaoud is very smart and has a good
understanding of English.
4. I began dating and having sexual relations with Mahaoud in October 1998. In
February 1999,1 learned that I was pregnant and informed Mahaoud that he was the father.
5. Soon after learning of the pregnancy, I discussed with Mahaoud our various options to
deal with the pregnancy and the child. I asked what he thought of adoption, Mahaoud responded
that he does not believe in adoption.
6. Throughout the pregnancy, beginning in February 1999,1 counseled with Carolyn
Chudley, a social worker at LDS Family Services, regarding my options for the baby, including
adoption. I attended several group meetings with other prospective unwed mothers to discuss
planning and options, including adoption. I informed Mahaoud of these sessions and group
meetings.
7. I never told Mahaoud that I would not place the child for adoption.
8. My baby was born August 10, 1999, in a Salt Lake County hospital. I informed
Mahaoud of the birth that same day. The baby was premature and had to remain in the hospital
for medical reasons until November 9, 1999.
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9. Sometime following the birth, I decided to place my child for adoption. The decision
was very difficult, but I knew that I was not in a position to provide what he needed. I knew that
adoption would be good for the baby. I made the decision because of my love for him.
10. I did not inform Mahaoud of my adoption decision at first because I feared he would
be upset. Still, I never told Mahaoud that I would not place the child for adoption.
11. On November 9, 1999,1 checked the baby out of the hospital and told Mahaoud of
my plan to place the child for adoption. That afternoon, I signed the paper relinquishing my
parental rights and consenting to my child's adoption.
12. Mahaoud did not pay any of the expenses of my pregnancy or the child's birth.
DATED this tf% day of January, 2000.

CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT
On this7

day of January, 2000, before me, a notary public, personally appeared JILL

LECHEMINANT, who signed the foregoing document in my presence and who swore or
affirmed to me that her signature is voluntary and the document truthful.

PHK&

•

^BST 1

.^^teofUteh

NOTARY PUBLIC

7]

i
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David M. McConkie (#2154)
Merrill F.Nelson (#3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendants
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MAHAOUD AL-BAHADLL
AFFIDAVIT OF CAROLYN
CHUDLEY

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 994907742

vs.
LDS FAMILY SERVICES and JILL
LECHEMINANT,

Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Carolyn Chudley, hereby depose and affirm as follows:
1. I am a social worker licensed by the State of Utah. I am employed by LDS Family
Services (" Agency"), which is licensed as a child placing agency by the State of Utah.

V» *J ^
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2. Jill first came to the Agency in February 1999, and we discussed her pregnancy and
the counseling and adoption services available from the Agency.
3. I subsequently had several counseling sessions with Jill at the Agency, in addition to
several phone conversations, between February and November 1999. She also attended several
group counseling sessions with other prospective unwed mothers.
4. At these individual and group counseling sessions, we discussed options for dealing
with unwed pregnancy, including marriage, single parenting, parenting skills, and adoption.
5. Jill informed me of the premature birth of her child on August 10, 1999. I continued
to counsel with Jill regarding adoption following the birth. She began to consider her selection
of potential adoptive parents.
6. Jill informed me of the putative father's occasional inquiries on whether she intended
to place the child for adoption, and of her responses that adoption was a possibility.
7. On October 18, 1999, with Jill's consent, I telephoned the putative father, Mahaoud
Al-Bahadli, to verify his understanding of the possible adoption. I explained my role as Jill's
adoption counselor. I understood from Jill that Mahaoud knew of her adoption counseling with
the Agency. I explained that, because they had apparently decided not to get married, Jill had
two options: to be a single parent or to place the child for adoption with a stable, loving family.
He responded that he did not believe Jill would place the child for adoption because "she loves
the baby too much," and "she knows that if she places for adoption that I will go and get the
baby."
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8. On the morning of November 9? 1999, Jill called to inform me that she was checking
the baby out of the hospital. She said that she had informed Mahaoud of her decision to place the
child for adoption, and that he responded that he was going to get an attorney.
9. Jill brought the baby to the Agency just after 2:00 p.m. on November 9, 1999. I
checked the paternity registry at the Bureau of Vital Statistics and learned that no notice of
paternity action had been filed with regard to Jill's baby. (Exhibit A.)
10. Jill signed the relinquishment of parental rights and consent to adoption at 2:55 p.m.
on November 9, 1999. (Exhibit B.) The child was placed with adoptive parents later that same
day, and the child has continuously resided with the adoptive parents to the present.
11. To the best of my information and belief, the putative father has never filed a notice
of paternity action with the Bureau of Vital Statistics. (Exhibit C.)
DATED this < f ^ d a y of January, 2000.

' ^

^<?

Carolyn ChUdley
i/

CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT
On this/

day of January, 2000, before me, a notary public, personally appeared

CAROLYN CHUDLEY, who signed the foregoing document in my presence and who swore or
affirmed to me that her signature is voluntary and the document truthful.

Notary Public

|

CONNIE N.BARNEY .
W S460CI4:

60 East South Temple Ste 1800 I
Salt Lake City Utah 84111-1004 .
'^Sf^mmiSSlon Exp,res
J
January 22 2003

L 2^Hf^L — .«. Stet^ofJLItah s

LA'KIVJS

J'?

NOTARY PUBLIC

/Ota'}WU~,s
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH
FOR NOTICE OF THE INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY
Name ol Mother

JILL LECHEMINANT
Place ol Child's Birth

Date of Child's Birth or Estimated Birth Date

i SALT LAKE CITY UTAH

Sex ol Child

08-10-99

MALE

(This is to certify that a search has been made of the file of Notices of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity and/or
tjhe father's name is reported on the birth certificate with the Bureau of Vital Records, and no record was found to be on file.
If a Notice of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity is found on file or the father's name is reported on the birth ,
certificate, a certified copy will be issued. If no record is on file, a CERT^lCATE^OFSEARCHJa issued.
A

11-09-99
Date
UDH-BVR-23

2:40 PM
Time

State Registrar

Revised 5/95

Exhibit A
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RELINQUISHMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS, CONSENT TO ADOPTION
AND CONSENT TO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
CE.IRTH MOTTSES. - UT i^K>

STATE OF

UTAH

)
:ss

COUNTY OF
I,
1.
at

SALT LAKE

Jill LeCheminant

)
being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

I am the mother of a MALE

child, who was bora at/A ,16? n/ftime] on the 10th day of Aueust. 1999.

Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

2.

This child was neither conceived nor born within a marriage.

3.

I am not a member of an Indian Tribe and I am not an Alaska Native. To the best of my knowledge, the

child's father is not a member of an Indian Tribe or an Alaska Native, and to the best of my knowledge, this child is not
eligible for membership in. an Indian Tribe or an Alaska Regional Corporation.
4. Because I feel that it is in this child's best interests to be placed for adoption, I hereby irrevocably release and
relinquish this child to the care, custody, and control of LDS Social Services for placement for adoption.
5. I fully understand that by signing this Relinquishment, Consent to Adoption and Consent to Termination of
parental Rights, I am giving up all my parental rights to this child, and that my decision to place this child for adoption
with LDS Social Services is final and I cannot change my mind.
6. I consent to the legal adoption of this child by the adoptive parents I have selected in consultation with LDS
Social Services. If, after placing this child with the adoptive parents whom I have selected, LDS Social Services, in its
sole and absolute discretion, decides that it is not in the child's best interest for the adoptive parents I have selected to
complete the adoption, and removes the child from the home, LDS Social Services may, in its sole and absolute
discretion, select another adoptive family with whom this child shall be placed for adoption, and I hereby consent to the
legal adoption of this child by said family.
7.

I consent to the absolute and final termination of my parental rights.

8. I hereby waive the right to notice of any and all legal proceedings which maybe held in courts of the state
of Utah, or elsewhere, in connection with the adoption of this child or the termination of my parental rights.
9. I have read the foregoing Relinquishment of Parental Rights, Consent to Adoption and Consent to
Termination of Parental Rights and I fully understand its terms and conditions. My decision to relinquish this child to
LDS Social Services and to consent to the adoption of this child and termination of my parental rights has been made
voluntarily and of my own free will and choice. I am signing this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption freely and
voluntarily, without any coercion, force or duress and without any payment or promise to pay any money or other thing
of value for the purpose of inducing me to place this child for adoption, consent to an adoption and termination of my
parental rights or cooperate in the completion of an adoption.
10. I am not under the influence of any medication, drug or substance which would impair my ability to reason
and make decisions.

1
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RELINQUISHMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS, CONSENT TO ADOPTION
AND CONSENT TO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
(BIRTH MOTHER - UTAH)
11. More than twenty-four (24) hours have passed since the birth of this baby.
12. I agree that this Relinquishment, Consent to Adoption and Consent to Termination of Parental Rights shall
be signed and interpreted according to the laws of the State of Utah, and I agree to submit myself to the jurisdiction of
the State of Utah with regard to the subject matter of this Relinquishment, Consent to Adoption and consent to
Termination of Parental Rights.

Date
S lgnat^rpo fiMother

Time: 7: £& fmW

CERTIFICATION

I,

Carolyn Chudley

hereby declare that:

1. I am a representative of LDS Social Services, a licensed child-placing agency, and I have been authorized
to take relinquishments and consents to adoption.
2. I certify that, to the best of my information and belief, the person executing the foregoing Relinquishment
of Parental Rights, Consent to Adoption and Consent to Termination of Parental Rights has read and understands said
document and has signed it freely and voluntarily.
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES

By

( \ . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ C ^ C ^

7 —

T

2
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RELINQUISHMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS, CONSENT TO ADOPTION
AND CONSENT TO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
(BIRTH MOTHER - UTAH)

NOTARIZATION
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF

)

:ss
On the

day of

, 19

, personally appeared before me _

[birth mother], who signed the foregoing Relinquishment of Parental Rights in my presence and who
swore or affirmed to me that her signature is voluntary and the document truthful.

Notary Public
Residing at:
My commission expires:

WITNESSES
We, fS I a\Y)0 c\ U P Q e H c W

and

K\Y^l

fr\lZ\-Vl

, are witnesses to the foregoing

Relinquishment of Parental Rights, Consent to Adoption and Consent to Tennination of Parental Rights signed by
Jill LeCheminant .
We do each hereby declare as follows:
1.

I am not affiliated with LDS Social Services and I am not a member of the birth mother's family.

2. The birth mother has stated that she has read and understands the foregoing Relinquishment of Parental
Rights, Consent to Adoption and Consent to Termination of Parental Rights and that the document is truthful.

3.

To the best of my information and belief, the birth parent signed this document freely and voluntarily.

Date

\\\A\^
Date

Witness

(y^

KWft^if

Witness

BMRelinq 96

00

00016

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH
FOR NOTICE OF THE INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY
Name of Mother

J I L L LECHEMINANT
Date of Child's Birth or Estimated Birth Date

/Place of Child's Birth

!

Sex of Child

08-10-99

SALT LAKE CITY UTAH

MALE

* This is to certify that a search has been made of the file of Notices of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity and/or
the father's name is reported on the birth certificate with the Bureau of Vital Records, and no record was found to be on file.
If a Notice of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity is found on file or the father's name is reported on the birth
certificate, a certified copy will be issued. If no record is on file, a CERTlFICATjEJDF SEARCH is issued.

11-10-99
Date
UDH-BVR-23

1:23 PM
State Registrar

Time

u

Revised 5/95

Exhibit CI
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH
FOR NOTICE OF THE INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY
Mama of Xfol/isr

J i l l La Chemlnant
Place ol Child's Birth

*

Sox of Child

Dale ol Child's Biflh or Estimated Binh Dale

Salt Lake City/, Utah

s

Male

AuRust 10, 1999

This Is Io certify (hat a search has been made of the file of Notices of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity and/or
the father's name.is reported on ihe birth cerlMicate with the Bureau of Vital Records, and no record was Iound lo be on file.
If a Notice of the Initiation of Proceedfngs to Establish Paternity Is found on file or the father's name is repo/ted on the birth
certificate, a certified copy will be issued. II no record is on lite, a QERTIFJCATE
CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH is Issued.

December 13, 1999
Date
UDH-BVR-23

Revised 5/95

1:37 PH
Time

•• •

•

State Registrar
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Affordable Legal Advocates
G. Brent Smith #6657
Steven C. Russell #6791
Attorney for Plaintiff
180 South 300 West Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 532-5100
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
Mahaoud Al-Bahadli,
AFFIDAVIT OF MAHAOUD ALBAHADLI
Plaintiff,
vs.

case no. 994907742

LDS Family Services; Jill
Lecheminant,

Judge Bohling

Commissioner
Defendant.
Plaintiff answers the facts as alleged by Respondent in her
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts.
1. I am 31 years old.

Plaintiff states:

Jill is 19 years old.

2. I agree with 52.
3. Jill and I never, at any time, discussed adoption.
53 is false.

Therefore,

We did discuss abortion, briefly, and both

agreed it was not an option.
4. I never knew that Jill was attending unwed-mother group
sessions at LDS family services.
classes.

I knew she was attending

But when I asked her what the classes were for, she

told me that they were for new mothers, told help them learn
how the care for a baby.

I asked if I could attend, but she

told me that she would teach me, and that I would not like the

00050
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classes, because those in attendance were all female.
5. I agree with f5.
6. On October 18th, 1999, Carolyn Chudley did call me.
how the baby was doing.
"place the child.M
"place.11

She asked

She asked if Jill was going to

I did not understand what she meant by

Never, at any time during the conversation, did

Carolyn Chudley use the word ""adoption.11 I am from Iraq, and
prior to my child being adopted, I had never heard of the word
""adoption;11 I had no idea as to what it meant.

To this day,

I cannot understand why anyone would want to give away their
own child.

This is contrary to everything that my culture and

my religion have taught me. While speaking with Carolyn, I
assumed she was asking where the child and Jill and I would be
living, or whether the child would be living with Jill at her
parents1 home, temporarily.
7. I agree with f7.
8. I filed a notice of paternity claim with the Utah Department
of Health, on January 14th, 2 000.
Mahaoud Al-Bahadli
Plaintiff-^
Subscribed and sworn before me this
J^
day of
<0$n\i&Wj
2000.
Notary
ANN BUSTIIXOS
NOTARYPU8UC*

STATEofUTAH
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78-30-4, 78-30-4.1.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 245, § 24 repeals
this section, as repealed and reenacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 61, relating to consent to
adoption and paternity claims, effective April
23, 1990. For present comparable provisions,
see § 78-30-4.14 et seq.

78-30-4.2 to 78-30-4.5.

Renumbered.

Renumbered. - Laws 1995, ch. 168, §§ 8
to 11 renumber former §§ 78-30-4.2 to 78-304.5, relating to consents and relinquishments,

78-30-4.6 to 78-30-4.8.

custody pending final decree, as § 78-30-4.22,
effective May 1, 1995.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1995, ch. 168, § 15 repeals
§ 78-30-4.10, as enacted by Laws 1990, ch. 245,
§ 14, relating to contested adoptions, effective

78-30-4.11.

effective May 1, 1995. For present comparable
provisions, see §§ 78-30-4.13 and 78-30-4.14.
Laws 1995, ch. 20 attempted to amend § 78-304.8 but this repeal made that amendment ineffective.

Renumbered.

Renumbered. - Laws 1995, ch. 168, § 12
renumbers former § 78-30-4.9, providing for

78-30-4.10.

as §§ 78-30-4.18, 78-30-4.20, 78-30-4.21, and
78-30-4.19, effective May 1, 1995.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1995, ch. 168, § 15 repeals
former §§ 78-30-4.6 to 78-30-4.8, as enacted by
Laws 1990, ch. 245, §§ 10 and 11 and as last
amended by Laws 1994, ch. 12, § 119, each of
which described individuals who must be notified of and/or consent to adoption proceedings,

78-30-4.9.

Laws 1995, ch. 168, § 15 repeals § 78-30-4.1,
as last amended by Laws 1993, ch. 4, § 125,
requiring relinquishment or consent from various parties prior to adoption, effective May 1,
1995. For present comparable provisions, see §
78-30-4.14.

May 1, 1995. For present comparable provisions, see § 78-30-4.16.

Definition.

For purposes of this chapter, "unmarried biological father" means a child's
biological father who is not married to the child's mother at the time of the
conception or birth of that child.
History: C. 1953, 78-30-4.11, enacted by L.
1995, ch. 168, § 1.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1995, ch.
168, which created §§ 78-30-4.11 to 78-30-4.24,
directs in § 16: "If any provision of this act, or
the application of any provision to any person

or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder
of this act is given effect without the invalid
provision or application."
Effective Dates. — Laws 1995, ch. 168
became effective on May 1, 1995, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-30-4.12. Rights a n d responsibilities of parties in adoption proceedings.
(1) The Legislature finds that the rights and interests of all parties affected
by an adoption proceeding must be considered and balanced in determining
what constitutional protections and processes are necessary and appropriate.
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(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner, in preventing the
disruption of adoptive placements, and in holding parents accountable for
meeting the needs of children;
(b) an unmarried mother, faced with the responsibility of making
crucial decisions about the future of a newborn child, is entitled to privacy
and has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her
future and the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance regarding
the permanence of an adoptive placement;
(c) adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in
adoptive placements;
(d) adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and
privacy interest in retaining custody of an adopted child; and
(e) an unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and
full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth. The state has a compelling interest in
requiring unmarried biological fathers to demonstrate that commitment
by providing appropriate medical care and financial support and by
establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the requirements of this
chapter.
(3) (a) In enacting Sections 78-30-4.11 through 78-30-4.21, the Legislature
prescribes the conditions for determining whether an unmarried biological
father's action is sufficiently prompt and substantial to require constitutional protection.
(b) If an unmarried biological father fails to grasp the opportunities to
establish a relationship with his child that are available to him, his
biological parental interest may be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in
constitutional significance by his failure to timely exercise it, or by his
failure to strictly comply with the available legal steps to substantiate it.
(c) A certain degree of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the
state's compelling interest. The Legislature finds that the interests of the
state, the mother, the child, and the adoptive parents described in this
section outweigh the interest of an unmarried biological father who does
not timely grasp the opportunity to establish and demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.
(d) An unmarried biological father has the primary responsibility to
protect his rights.
(e) An unmarried biological father is presumed to know that the child
may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies with the
provisions of this chapter, manifests a prompt and full commitment to his
parental responsibilities, and establishes paternity.
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried mother has a right of privacy
with regard to her pregnancy and adoption plan, and therefore has no legal
obligation to disclose the identity of an unmarried biological father prior to or
during an adoption proceeding, and has no obligation to volunteer information
to the court with respect to the father.
History: C. 1953,78-30-4.12, enacted by L.
1995, ch. 168, § 2.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1995, cb. 168

became effective on May 1, 1995, pursuant to
Utab Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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(Utah Ct. App.), affd, 795 R2d 637 (Utah
1990).
For case establishing due process requirements relating to notice of paternity filing, see
Ellis v. Social Servs. Dep't of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 R2d 1250
(Utah 1980).
Father's rights.
Dismissal of petition by mother and maternal
grandfather to allow the grandfather to adopt
the child was proper since, even though the
father of the child failed to file an
acknowledgement of paternity before the filing
of the adoption petition, the parties were on
notice that the issue of the father's rights and
his entitlement to a hearing had been raised
previously and the father had standing to ob-

ject to the petition. R.J.G. v. M.J.M., 869 R2d
997 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Wrongful termination of parental rights,
Termination of a non-resident father's parental rights to his illegitimate son violated due
process, where although a petition for adoption
was
^ e d t w o d a y s p r i o r t o t h e f a t l i e r ' s ^^S of
a
notice of paternity, all parties were distinctly
awar
* °\, t h e ftheT s ^ n t and desire to rear
the cMd
' a n d t h e r e c o r d indicated that the
mother's family deliberately withheld information m o r d e r to a v o i d
potential "problems" with
tne
^ at ner, who they knew would obstruct the
adoption. In re Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686
(Utah 1986) (decided under former § 78-304.8).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, The
Putative Father's Due Process Rights to Notice

and a Hearing: In re Baby Boy Doe, 1986 B.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1081.

78-30-4.14. Necessary consent to adoption or relinquishment for adoption.
(1) Either relinquishment for adoption to a licensed child-placing agency or
consent to adoption is required from:
(a) the adoptee, if he is more than 12 years of age, unless he does not
have the mental capacity to consent;
(b) both parents or the surviving parent of an adoptee who was
conceived or born within a marriage, unless the adoptee is 18 years of age
or older;
(c) the mother of an adoptee born outside of marriage;
(d) any biological parent who has been adjudicated to be the child's
biological father by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to the mother's
execution of consent or her relinquishment to an agency for adoption;
(e) any biological parent who has executed a voluntary declaration of
paternity in accordance with Title 78, Chapter 45e, prior to the mother's
execution of consent or her relinquishment to an agency for adoption;
(f) an unmarried biological father of an adoptee, as defined in Section
78-30-4.11, only if the requirements and conditions of Subsection (2)(a) or
(b) have been proven; and
(g) the licensed child-placing agency to whom an adoptee has been
relinquished and that is placing the child for adoption.
(2) In accordance with Subsection (1), the consent of an unmarried biological
father is necessary only if the father has strictly complied with the requirements of this section.
(a) (i) With regard to a child who is placed with adoptive parents more
than six months after birth, an unmarried biological father shall have
developed a substantial relationship with the child, taken some
measure of responsibility for the child and the child's future, and
demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood
by financial support of the child, of a fair and reasonable sum and in
490
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accordance with the father's ability, when not prevented from doing so
by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child,
and either:
(A) visiting the child at least monthly when physically and
financially able to do so, and when not prevented from doing so by
the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the
child; or
(B) regular communication with the child or with the person or
agency having the care or custody of the child, when physically
and financially unable to visit the child, and when not prevented
from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful
custody of the child.
(ii) The subjective intent of an unmarried biological father, whether
expressed or otherwise, unsupported by evidence of acts specified in
this subsection shall not preclude a determination that the father
failed to meet the requirements of this subsection.
(iii) An unmarried biological father who openly lived with the child
for a period of six months within the one-year period after the birth of
the child and immediately preceding placement of the child with
adoptive parents, and openly held himself out to be the father of the
child during that period, shall be deemed to have developed a
substantial relationship with the child and to have otherwise met the
requirements of this subsection,
(b) With regard to a child who is under six months of age at the time he
is placed with adoptive parents, an unmarried biological father shall have
manifested a full commitment to his parental responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in this subsection prior to the time the mother
executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to a licensed
child-placing agency. The father shall:
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity, and file with that court a sworn
affidavit stating that he is fully able and willing to have full custody
of the child, setting forth his plans for care of the child, and agreeing
to a court order of child support and the payment of expenses incurred
in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth;
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with
the state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health,
in a confidential registry established by the department for that
purpose; and
(iii) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, paid a fair and
reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the
mother's pregnancy and the child's birth, in accordance with his
means, and when not prevented from doing so by the person or
authorized agency having lawful custody of the child.
(3) An unmarried biological father whose consent is required under Subsection (1) or (2) may nevertheless lose his right to consent if the court determines,
in accordance with the requirements and procedures of Title 78, Chapter 3a,
Part 4, Termination of Parental Rights Act, that his rights should be terminated, based on the petition of any interested party.
(4) If there is no showing that an unmarried biological father has consented
to or waived his rights regarding a proposed adoption, the petitioner shall file
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with the court a certificate from the state registrar of vital statistics within the
Department of Health, stating that a diligent search has been made of the
registry of notices from unmarried biological fathers described in Subsection
(2)(b)(ii), and that no filing has been found pertaining to the father of the child
in question, or if a filing is found, stating the name of the putative father and
the time and date of filing. That certificate shall be filed with the court prior to
entrance of a final decree of adoption.
(5) An unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly comply
with each of the conditions provided in this section, is deemed to have waived
and surrendered any right in relation to the child, including the right to notice
of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child,, and his
consent to the adoption of the child is not required.
History: C. 1953, 78-30-4.14, enacted by L.
1995, ch. 168, § 4.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1995, ch. 168

became effective on May 1, 1995, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Compiler's Notes. — The following notes
include those taken under former § 78-30-4.1
ANALYSIS

Abandonment.
Consent.
Construction of statute.
Duress.
Duty and ability to provide support.
Finding of abandonment.
Grandparents.
Judicial termination of rights.
Review of district court determination.
Welfare of child.
Wrongful termination of parental rights.
Ab andonment.
Where wife earlier had brought an action
seeking custody of children, alleging desertion
and nonsupport, and court awarded custody to
wife to the exclusion of the husband "who shall
have no right to see, visit or otherwise exercise
any parental rights to such children unless and
until the husband shall have made application
to this court for permission so to do and shall
have made proper provision for the support and
maintenance of said minor children,''the decree
did not constitute a judicial determination of
desertion dispensing with the husband's consent to an adoption. The decree was conditional, and recognized parental rights in the
husband, who, by its terms, could assert such
rights by performance of the conditions. The
divestment of paternal rights by desertion
must be of all such rights. In re Walton, 123
Utah 380, 259 P.2d 881 (1953).
Evidence that the husband, after a divorce,
had sent occasional money for his children, and
had visited them at times and had the children
at his home at times, but had never furnished

fall support does not establish the necessary
intent to desert a child. In re Walton, 123 Utah
380, 259 P.2d 881 (1953).
Mother did not "desert" children within
meaning of statute when she was sentenced to
prison for issuing a fraudulent check since, in
such case, she had not intentionally abandoned
them even though she committed a second
felony knowing full well that she might be
incarcerated therefor. In re Jameson, 20 Utah
2d 53, 432 P.2d 881 (1967).
Evidence was sufficient to support a finding
of abandonment and permit adoption without
the consent of the mother where during an
interval of four years the mother failed to
communicate or attempt to communicate with
her children, failed to exercise her rights of
visitation pursuant to a divorce decree, and
showed little interest in her children's welfare.
In re Adoption of Guzman, 586 P.2d 418 (Utah
1978).
Consent.
Adoption consent which failed to meet statutory requirements could not be given any legal
effect. In re Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 324 P2d 773
(1958).
Natural parents may execute a valid consent
for adoption prior to the completion of the
investigative report conducted by the division
of family services. In re S., 572 P.2d 1370 (Utah
1977).
Construction of statute.
Adoption proceedings are statutory and
based on consent. So where statutes dispense
with the consent of a legitimate natural parent
who for some misconduct has been deprived of
the custody of his child, a strict construction is
given such statutes in cases in which the natural parent contests the adoption. Deveraux'
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